Anti-risk epistemology and negative epistemic dependence by Pritchard, Duncan
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anti-risk epistemology and negative epistemic dependence
Citation for published version:
Pritchard, D 2017, 'Anti-risk epistemology and negative epistemic dependence', Synthese, pp. 1-16.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1586-6
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1007/s11229-017-1586-6
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Synthese
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 11. May. 2020
Synthese
DOI 10.1007/s11229-017-1586-6
S.I . : EPISTEMIC DEPENDENCE
Anti-risk epistemology and negative epistemic
dependence
Duncan Pritchard1
Received: 6 March 2017 / Accepted: 3 October 2017
© The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication
Abstract Support is canvassed for a new approach to epistemology called anti-risk
epistemology. It is argued that this proposal is rooted in the motivations for an existing
account, known as anti-luck epistemology, but is superior on a number of fronts. In par-
ticular, anti-risk epistemology is better placed than anti-luck epistemology to supply
the motivation for certain theoretical moves with regard to safety-based approaches
to knowledge. Moreover, anti-risk epistemology is more easily extendable to episte-
mological questions beyond that in play in the theory of knowledge specifically. A
key advantage of the view, however, is that anti-risk epistemology fares much better
than anti-luck epistemology when it comes to accounting for the phenomenon of neg-
ative epistemic dependence. In particular, anti-risk epistemology is ideally placed to
explain why such epistemic dependence is incompatible with knowledge, even when
the negative epistemic dependence in play is of a purely modal variety (as one finds
in epistemic twin earth cases).
Keywords Epistemology · Epistemic luck · Epistemic risk · Epistemic dependence ·
Knowledge · Epistemic twin earth cases
1 Anti-luck epistemology
One of the guiding platitudes in epistemology is that knowledge excludes luck.1 It is
an intuition of this general sort that is meant to explain, for example, why knowledge
1 For a dissenting voice in this regard, see Hetherington (2013), which is in turn a response to Pritchard
(2013).
B Duncan Pritchard
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is lacking in Gettier-style cases, even though the belief is true and justified (and often
enjoys other forms of epistemic support too, such as being formed via a reliable basis,
etc). The guiding thought behind an anti-luck epistemology is that such a platitude
presents one with a principled way of approaching the theory of knowledge. Rather
than working piecemeal through a range of putative anti-Gettier conditions and seeing
which one can deal with the cases in play, we instead adopt a three-stage approach. The
first stage is to offer an account of luck. The second stage is to specify the particular
way in which knowledge excludes luck (there can be lucky discoveries, after all, so
there must be ways in which there can be lucky knowledge). The third and final stage is
to put these two parts together and thereby come up with a formulation of an anti-luck
condition on knowledge.
In terms of the first stage, I have argued at length elsewhere for a modal account
of luck.2 Very roughly, on this view lucky events are to be understood as those events
that obtain in the actual world but which fail to obtain in close possible worlds where
the relevant initial conditions for the target event are kept fixed.3 Winning the lottery
is thus lucky, since in close possible worlds where the relevant initial conditions for
the event are kept fixed (e.g., the lottery is still fair and has similarly long odds), one
fails to win. In contrast, it is not a matter of luck that the parachute failed to open
given that it was sabotaged by the enemy spy, expert at such activities. In all close
possible worlds where we keep the relevant initial conditions for this event fixed (i.e.,
the enemy spy continues to be highly skilled in this regard, and continues to sabotage
the parachute), the parachute similarly fails to open.
Moreover, we can delineate the luckiness of an event in terms of how modally
close its non-obtaining would be, such that we can determine a continuum of degrees
of luck. So, for example, suppose that one is nearly hit by a sniper’s bullet, which
whizzes by one’s ear, such that one is lucky not to be shot. Ceteris paribus, this is
luckier than an equivalent scenario where the bullet flies by a metre or so away, which
is in turn luckier than an equivalent scenario where the bullet flies by some further
distance away, and so on. At some point, as the modal vicinity of one’s being hit by
the bullet becomes ceases to be all that close, we would cease to regard the event in
question as being lucky at all.4
In terms of the second stage, it is widely accepted that the kind of epistemic luck
that is incompatible with knowledge is what is known as veritic epistemic luck. This
occurs when it is a matter of luck that one’s belief is true, given how one formed it.
2 See especially Pritchard (2014). See also Pritchard (2004, 2005, 2006). Although this is the dominant
theory of luck in the philosophical literature, it does have its detractors, and there are proponents of alternative
views. For a useful recent volume which collects a range of literature on the philosophy of luck, including
pieces that are both in favour of, and critical of, the modal account, see Pritchard and Whittington (2015).
See also Levy (2011) and Coffman (2015).
3 I am here characterizing possible worlds in the standard way in terms of a similarity ordering. See, for
example, Lewis (1973, 1987). For further defence of this account of possible worlds in the context of the
modal account of luck, see Pritchard (2014, Sect. 3).
4 There is a wealth of empirical work with regard to the psychology of luck ascriptions that supports the
modal account. See Kahneman and Varey (1990), Teigen (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998a, b, 2003), Tetlock
(1998), and Tetlock and Lebow (2001). See Pritchard and Smith (2004) for a survey of this research. For
also Pritchard (2014), (2016b, §1).
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Veritic epistemic luck is to contrasted with epistemically benign forms of epistemic
luck that are compatible with knowledge, such as the evidential epistemic luck that
one happens to be in the right place and time to have the excellent evidence that one
does. Provided that one properly exploits this epistemic advantage, then one can come
to have knowledge regardless (i.e., in a way that is not, in particular, subject to veritic
epistemic luck).5
We now come to stage three, which is putting the modal account of luck together
with an account of knowledge such that it is incompatible with veritic epistemic luck.
The result is a modal condition on knowledge. In particular, when one knows one’s
true belief is formed in such a way that one couldn’t have easily on that same basis
formed a false belief. Moreover, in line with our continuum conception of degrees of
luck, we will tend to be completely intolerant of veritic epistemic luck when it involves
forming a false belief on the very same basis in very close possible worlds, with that
tolerance increasing as we move further out, to the point where we will eventually be
sanguine about the possibility of error because it is so remote.
Interestingly, the kind of modal condition that anti-luck epistemology is here moti-
vating is essentially a version of the safety condition for knowledge.6 This is usually
informally understood as the claim that one’s true belief could not have easily been
false. We are now able to offer a way of fleshing out this notion in modal terms, where
we bring in basis-relativity (in order to keep the initial conditions for the target event,
in this case the true belief, fixed), and where we also effectively ‘weight’ the very
closest possible worlds over not-so-close possible worlds that are also in the local
neighbourhood, in order to accommodate the continuum aspect of luck. It is thus not
just that anti-luck epistemology generates independent support for a particular condi-
tion on knowledge, but also that it gives us a principled basis for unpacking how best
to understand the usual informal presentation of that condition.7
Anti-luck epistemology also fares well in terms of accounting for the kinds of cases
that epistemologists have claimed involved knowledge-undermining epistemic luck.
Gettier-style cases, after all, essentially involve a subject forming a belief in a fashion
which, although it might enjoy certain kinds of epistemic pedigree (e.g., it is justified,
or reliably formed, say), is nonetheless such that, given how it was formed, it is a close
possibility that the subject ends up with a false belief.
Or consider the lottery puzzle, which also trades on knowledge-undermining epis-
temic luck. Why is it that it seems one can know that one has lost the lottery by
checking the results in a reliable newspaper (even when one is oblivious as to the long
odds involved in winning), but one cannot know that one has lost the lottery by merely
5 For further discussion of epistemically malignant and epistemically benign varieties of epistemic luck,
see Pritchard (2004, 2005).
6 For some key defences of the safety principle, see Luper (1984, cf. 2003), Sainsbury (1997), Sosa (1999),
Williamson (2000), and Pritchard (2002).
7 In particular, anti-luck epistemology favours the safety condition on knowledge over the other main
competing anti-luck condition in the literature, which is the sensitivity condition, at least as the latter is
usually understood anyway. For more on this point, see Pritchard (2007, 2012b). For some key defences
of the senstivity principle, see Dretske (1970, 1971), Nozick (1981), Roush (2005), Becker (2007), Black
and Murphy (2007), and Black (2002, 2008). For a comparative overview of the safety and sensitivity
prinicples, see Pritchard (2008) and Black (2011).
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reflecting on the long odds involved in winning? After all, from a purely probabilistic
point of view, it seems one ought to be better placed to know in the latter case, as
the odds of success are massively in one’s favour (even more so than in the former
case).
Anti-luck epistemology offers a very straightforward explanation of what is going
on here, which is that our judgements about knowledge and luck are ultimately sensitive
less to the probabilities involved and more to the modal closeness of error. In particular,
it is important to remember that low probability events can nonetheless be modally
close events, in that very little need change about the actual world in order for them
to occur. A lottery win is a case in point, in that although this is very low probability,
precisely the reason why people play lotteries is that they could very easily occur—just
a few coloured balls need to fall in a different configuration.8 This is why forming
one’s true belief that one has lost the lottery merely by reflecting on the odds involved
is not knowledge, since there is a very close possible world where one forms one’s
belief on the same basis and believes falsely as a result. In contrast, given the lengths
reliable newspapers go to ensure that they print the right lottery results, the possible
world in which one forms a false belief on this basis is not very close at all, which is
why this can be a route to knowledge.
The foregoing is not meant to be a full defence of anti-luck epistemology, since that
would take us too far afield for our purposes, but merely an overview of its virtues.9
In fact, I want to argue that while anti-luck epistemology is broadly on the right
lines, it nonetheless needs to be reconfigured in an important respect. In particular,
we need to alter it so that the notion of epistemic risk is central, rather than epistemic
luck. As we will see, this reconfiguration offers several main advantages: it removes a
couple of theoretical lacunae in anti-luck epistemology, it offers us a better diagnostic
account of why knowledge has such a distinctive modal profile, and the resulting
proposal is more easily extendable to other epistemic standings beyond knowledge.
These considerations will be set out in the next section. But there is also another key
advantage, which will be our focus in Sect. 3, which how an anti-risk epistemology is
much better placed to account for why cases of what I refer to as negative epistemic
dependence are knowledge-undermining.
8 That is, placing a bet on a lottery win (i.e., by purchasing a ticket) is very unlike the usual case of placing
a bet on an event with astronomically low odds (e.g., that a completely useless football team will win
this year’s FA Cup). Interestingly, the slogan for the UK’s national lottery“It could be you!”?confirms this
point. This is clearly not the ‘could’ of probability, since in this sense it (realistically) couldn’t be you, as
the odds are astronomically against you, but rather the ‘could’ of modal nearness i.e., if you play the lottery,
then someone just like you will win it. This is borne out by their advertising campaign, which at one point
featured a God-like finger hoverring over ticket-holders, and then zapping one of them (the winner). Note
that in arguing that one would be crazy to bet on a modally far-fetched event with similar odds to a lottery
win I am not thereby suggeting that playing the lottery is rational. The point is rather that whatever one
thinks of the rationality of playing the lottery, placing a bet on a modally far-fetched event with similar odds
(such as the completely useless team winnig the FA Cup) would be, from a rational point of view, much
worse.
9 I offer a fuller defence of anti-luck epistemology in a number of places see especially Pritchard (2007,
2012b).
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2 From anti-luck epistemology to anti-risk epistemology
In order to understand why the shift from an anti-luck to an anti-risk epistemology
might be beneficial, we first need to notice some of the key differences between luck
and risk. As I’ve argued elsewhere, luck and risk are closely entwined notions, and as
such risk is just as amenable to a modal account, cast along broadly the same lines as
the modal account of luck.10 Indeed, in the relevant empirical literature, work on luck
ascriptions and risk ascriptions often goes hand-in-hand.11 This means that just as we
are to think of luck in modal terms by focussing on relevant features of the modal
environment, so we are to think of risk in modal terms by focussing on essentially
similar features of the modal environment.12 With these points in mind, it is easier to
specify when these notions diverge and thus where the modal account of risk diverges,
in detail, from the modal account of luck rather than where they converge. I will here
focus on two key differences.13
The first is that assessments of risk involve an essentially forwards-looking per-
spective on events, unlike luck assessments, which involve an essentially backwards-
looking perspective.14 Take our agent from earlier who narrowly missed being hit by
the sniper’s bullet. In terms of a risk assessment of this scenario, we take the perspec-
tive of the subject prior to the bullet flying by and observe that she was at a high risk
of being hit. In terms of a luck assessment of this scenario, in contrast, we take the
perspective of the subject after the bullet has missed and observe that she was lucky
not to have been hit.
A related point in this regard is that in cases where we are concerned with an
assessment pairing of luck and risk, such as in the sniper’s case just considered, I take
it that normally the reason why we are interested in luck is because of the risk involved,
10 See especially Pritchard (2015b).
11 For more on this point, see Pritchard (2004, 2015b); §4). See also the empirical literature cited in footnote
4 above, much of which simultaneously concerns both luck and risk ascriptions.
12 Note that the modal account of risk runs counter to the most prominent theory of risk in the literature,
which is cast along broadly probabilistic lines. See Hansson (2004, 2014) for two excellent surveys of
recent theoretical work on risk (which puts the probabilistic account centre-stage). See (Pritchard 2015b,
§§2–3) for a comparative discussion of the modal and probabilistic accounts of risk.
13 Note that these two differences are far from exhaustive. For example, one further difference is that luck
is more clearly a threshold notion. In terms of the modal account of luck, this means that once the possible
world where the non-obtaining of the target event becomes sufficiently far-out, then it no longer makes
sense to talk of that event as being lucky at all. In contrast, we can usually meaningfully talk of a very low
level of risk, even if that risk is so negligible that we wouldn’t want to talk about the target event being risky
[though there is usually a minimal threshold for risk what is known in the literature as de minimis risk. See
Mumpower (1986) and Petersen (2002) for discussion]. Another difference is that luck is bivalent, in the
sense that there can be both good and bad luck. In contrast, risk is often (though not exclusively) negatively
characterised in terms of the avoidance of hazardous events. See Pritchard (forthcoming) for a discussion
of those unusual cases where risk adds positive value to an activity, such as dangerous sports or when an
artist takes aesthetic risks. See Pritchard (2015b) for further discussion of the differences between luck and
risk.
14 In order to keep matters simple, I am here focusing on risk as it applies to events, in keeping with the
event-focused notion of luck offered earlier. In both cases, however, we can extend these accounts to targets
other than events. (Indeed, I think the more natural focal point for risk ascriptions is often activities rather
than events).
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rather than vice versa. Risk tends to concern hazardous events, such as being shot, and
hence events that we wish to avoid. Finding out that we are lucky not to have been
shot is alarming precisely because it entails that we were at a high risk of being shot.
The second way that the notions of luck and risk diverge is that assessments of risk
are always made relative to a specific risk event (or risk events). When evaluating the
risk involved in, say, flying a plane, we can do so relative to a range of target risk
events, such as the plane crashing, one having a panic attack mid-flight, being sat next
to a noisy passenger, and so on. Which risk event we focus on will have a bearing on
whether the activity counts as risky. The prospect of the plane crashing may be low
risk, for example, but the prospect of being seated next to a noisy passenger may well
be high risk.
In contrast, assessments of luck, as we noted above, don’t focus on specific events
in this way, but rather concern the non-obtaining of the target event, given the same
relevant initial conditions, across close possible worlds. This is one important way that
the modal account of risk diverges from the modal account of luck, in that what we
are interested in is how modally close the risk event is, given that we keep the initial
conditions fixed. So, for example, if the risk event associated with taking a flight is the
plane crashing, then the question we want to settle is how modally close is the scenario
where all the relevant initial conditions are kept fixed (i.e., the subject continues to
board the plane, the plane is as well-constructed as it is in the actual world, and so
on) but the subject crashes. If this possible world is close, then this activity of taking
the flight is high risk, but if it is not, then it is low risk. As before, we also have a
continuum of riskiness in play here, depending on how modally close, or far-out, the
target risk event is.15 The crucial difference with the modal account of luck, however,
is that the modal account of risk is specifically concerned with the modal closeness of
a particular risk event, rather than with the general non-obtaining of the target event in
the modal neighbourhood.16 See also the application of this notion of risk to particular
domains, such as aesthetics and law, in Pritchard (forthcoming, 2016b, 2017b). For a
recent account of risk which overlaps in some respect with the one just offered, but
which also diverges in some important respects too, see Broncano-Berrocal (2015).
Putting these two points together, how will an anti-risk epistemology differ from an
anti-luck epistemology Let us begin with the lacunae in anti-luck epistemology that
anti-risk epistemology enables us to evade. These lacunae have not been spotted, but
that is because they are so well hidden. The first concerns the way in which we have
transplanted our modal account of luck into an anti-luck epistemology.
Recall that the luckiness of an event depends on how modally close the non-
obtaining of that event is. When the modal account of luck is applied to veritic epistemic
luck, this gets translated in terms of a true belief where it is an easy possibility that one
forms a false belief. If we were to follow the modal account in a strict fashion, however,
then veritic epistemic luck should be a true belief where it is an easy possibility that
one doesn’t form a true belief. The question is thus why anti-luck epistemology opts
15 Though bearing in mind, when it comes to this continuum, that luck is much more of a threshold notion
than risk is see footnote 13 for further discussion of this point.
16 For further discussion of this notion of risk, see Pritchard (2015b).
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for the more restrictive rendering of the anti-luck condition (i.e., where the relevant
sense of cognitive failure is understood as false belief specifically, as opposed to the
disjunction of false belief and non-belief), given that this restrictive rendering is not
in fact motivated by the modal account of luck?
The reason why becomes apparent once one follows through the implications of
this move, in that it would rule out genuine cases of knowledge. In particular, it would
rule out as knowledge those cases involving evidential epistemic luck, even though we
saw above that this species of epistemic luck is entirely compatible with knowledge.
Imagine that an agent just happens to be in the right place and at the right time to
overhear a crucial snippet of conversation, and thereby forms a true belief on this
basis. Given that the opportunity presented to the agent was properly exploited, this
true belief ought to amount to knowledge. Even so it could well be that in all close
possible worlds this agent wouldn’t be so situated as to form this true belief, in that
she would instead not form any belief on this basis since she was never well enough
situated to hear enough of the conversation to work out what was being said. In this case
while it is not an easy possibility that she forms a false belief, it is an easy possibility
that she forms no belief. Accordingly, if one opts for the weak inclusive rendering
of the anti-luck condition (i.e., where cognitive failure translates as either non-belief
or false belief), then one would be obliged to treat the agent as lacking knowledge,
contrary to intuition.
It is thus very important that anti-luck epistemology opts for the restrictive render-
ing of the anti-luck condition, rather than the inclusive rendering that is generated by
appealing to the modal account of luck. This theoretical lacuna in anti-luck epistemol-
ogy is not immediately apparent because the latter generates a basis-relative version
of safety (i.e., one where we keep the original basis for belief fixed across possible
worlds). As noted above, there is a rationale for this restriction, in that the modal
account of luck demands that we keep the relevant initial conditions for the target
event fixed, and keeping the basis for belief fixed is simply the cognitive analogue of
this restriction. This disguises the problem in play, however, since in the normal cases
of evidential epistemic luck, such as the one just given, the subject’s basis for belief is
also changing, and hence they do not arise as direct counterexamples to anti-luck epis-
temology. Accordingly, once basis-relativity is taken into account it might not seem to
matter whether one opts for the restrictive or the inclusive rendering of the anti-luck
condition (on this score anyway), since one cannot generate a direct counterexample
to the view either way.
Nonetheless, once we have a handle on the structure of the problem in play here,
it ought to be clear how one can adapt the cases to resurrect a counterexample to
anti-luck epistemology on the inclusive reading of the anti-luck condition (and hence
force a wedge between the two formulations of the view). Imagine, for example, a
subject who has a sound memorial basis for her belief that the Battle of Hastings was
in 1066. Suppose, however, that although our subject is accordingly confident of this
belief in the actual world there are close possible worlds where she is disposed to doubt
herself. Let’s say it is just a psychological fact about this subject that her confidence
in what she believes is quite variable, even though there is no epistemic basis for this
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variability (it is not as if, for example, she has reasons to doubt her memory).17 It will
now be true of such a subject that in close possible worlds she will have the same basis
for belief as in the actual world and yet will not believe the target proposition on this
basis. Accordingly, by the lights of the inclusive reading of anti-luck epistemology
(but not the restrictive reading) this agent ought to be regarded as having a true belief
which is subject to veritic epistemic luck and hence not in the market for knowledge.
But this seems like just the wrong result. It is not, after all, as if the subject is in error
in close possible worlds. In particular, in the relevant sense of cognitive failure that
interests us—i.e., false belief, formed on the same basis as in the actual world—the
subject has exhibited no cognitive failure at all, and hence ought to have a belief that
is in the market for knowledge.18
This is where the shift away from anti-luck epistemology to anti-risk epistemology
becomes important. Recall that the modal account of risk is not concerned merely
with the non-obtaining of the target event in the modal neighbourhood, but rather
more specifically with whether the relevant risk event obtains in the modal neighbour-
hood. In terms of eliminating epistemic risk from one’s knowledge, this will translate
as the claim that one is looking for a true belief on a particular basis, where the risk
event of forming a false belief on that same basis is not too modally close. In short,
we are demanding that knowledge excludes veritic epistemic risk, which is the ana-
logue of veritic epistemic luck in an anti-luck epistemology. By appealing directly to
anti-risk epistemology we can thus close this hitherto unnoticed lacuna in anti-luck
epistemology by appealing directly to the risk event of false belief.
As with anti-luck epistemology, the guiding thought will be that we are intolerant
of epistemic risk which is very high (i.e., where the risk event of false belief is modally
very close), and hence will not ascribe knowledge, but we will be tolerant of epistemic
risk that is very low (i.e., where the risk event of false belief is modally far-off). In
between these two extremes, there will be a continuum of increasing tolerance of
epistemic risk as the risk event moves further modally afield.
Anti-risk epistemology is also better placed than anti-luck epistemology to explain
why any belief formed in a necessary truth or even, for that matter, a proposition
whose truth is modally stable across close possible worlds, such that there is no close
possible world where it is false is not by default a safe true belief, regardless of how that
belief was formed. There is, after all, no close possible world where the target belief
in question is false. Anti-luck epistemology deals with this problem by appealing to
the basis-relativity of safety, something which we saw is motivated by the anti-luck
epistemology methodology. The thinking is that we only need to keep the actual basis
for belief fixed when we are examining the modal environment, and should not also
keep fixed the particular propositional content that is believed in the actual world.
Instead, we should be interested in cognitive failure that results from that basis for
belief in close possible worlds even when it concerns a different propositional content.
In this way, for example, while there is no close possible world where forming a true
17 This example is an adaption of Radford (1966) ‘diffident schoolboy’ case, albeit to illustrate a rather
different point.
18 There are lots of other putative counterexamples to safety, of course. I deal with such cases in various
places, but see, for example, (Pritchard 2012b, 2015a).
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belief in a mathematical proposition via a cognitive process that is lacking in any
epistemic pedigree (flipping coins, say) will lead to a belief in that same proposition
which is false, there will be close possible worlds where that cognitive process will
generate false beliefs in related propositions (e.g., where one is led to believing that
‘2 + 2 = 5’ rather than ‘2 + 2 = 4’)19 for further discussion of how anti-luck
epistemology deals with safe beliefs in necessary/modally stable truths.
The solution is elegant, but it isn’t at all clear that it is strictly speaking licensed by
anti-luck epistemology. The focus on the basis is principled, for sure, but why does it
follow from the fact that we need to keep the basis fixed that we can vary the doxastic
output from this basis across close possible worlds (aside, of course, from the fact that
doing so allows us to solve this problem with necessary truths)?
As before, the shift to an anti-risk epistemology resolves the problem, and via the
same means. For notice that by putting our focus on a specific risk event of cognitive
error we both in a sense narrow and in a sense broaden the ambit of our epistemological
concerns. It was a narrowing of our ambit of concern that dealt with the former lacuna
in anti-luck epistemology, by making us focus on cognitive error specifically rather
than the mere non-obtaining of the target epistemic event of true belief. But given
that our spotlight is now on how a certain basis might lead to cognitive error, it also
becomes clear why we need to broaden our ambit also to take in cases where this same
basis leads to cognitive error in close possible worlds where the doxastic output of the
basis is different from that in the actual world. That is, our concern is whether a basis
for belief that in the actual world led to a belief that p generates cognitive error in
close possible worlds, and not the narrower concern of whether a basis for belief that
in the actual world led to a belief that p generates false beliefs that p in close possible
worlds. We thus get the principled case we require for dealing with safe beliefs in
necessary/modally stable truths that was lacking in anti-luck epistemology.
In virtue of its focus on a specific epistemic risk event, anti-risk epistemology is also
more easily extendable than anti-luck epistemology to other epistemic goods besides
knowledge. The relevant epistemic risk event when it comes to knowledge is cognitive
error (on the same basis), but we can easily conceive of all kinds of scenarios where
the relevant epistemic goals are such that a distinct epistemic risk event (or events) will
be relevant. For example, we can imagine certain kinds of inquiry where the failure
to form true beliefs might be a very important epistemic risk event, and so may be
just as important indeed, may even be more important than the epistemic risk event of
cognitive error.20 More generally, just as our assessments of risk can vary substantially
depending on which risk event (or events) we are concerned with, so we can imagine
a whole range of epistemic assessments which are structured in terms of epistemic
risk events that are different in various ways from the specific epistemic risk event at
issue when it comes to knowledge (and which may involve the inherent complexity
that arises when there is more than one epistemic risk event in play).21
19 See Pritchard (2007, 2015a).
20 For example, one can imagine certain kinds of scientific inquiry where the pay-off for success is so great
that missing out on true beliefs carries a particularly high premium.
21 These aren’t the only advantages that anti-risk epistemology has over anti-luck epistemology. For exam-
ple, the former is better able to account for our intuitions in lottery-style cases than anti-luck epistemology.
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3 Anti-risk epistemology and negative epistemic dependence
We noted earlier that when it comes to events that are evaluated in terms of risk and
luck, the concern with luck is often in an important sense parasitic on the concern with
risk. It is significant that one was lucky not to be shot precisely because it reveals that
one was at a high risk of being shot, something that any sensible person would clearly
want to avoid. The same goes for epistemic events that are evaluated in terms of risk
and luck. We might say of the same true belief that, given how it was formed, it is
both only true as a matter of luck and that it was at a high risk of being false. But we
are only really concerned with the former because of the latter. Put another way, our
concern with eliminating veritic epistemic luck from knowledge is motivated by our
desire to eliminate the corresponding veritic epistemic risk i.e., the high risk, given
how our belief was formed, that it would have led us into cognitive error.
This point is important, since it helps us to realise just why we want to eliminate
veritic epistemic luck from knowledge. One might think that this point would be
redundant, given that most epistemologists have granted that knowledge excludes this
kind of epistemic luck. In the recent literature, however, there has been a growing
wave of commentators who have argued that knowledge can at least in certain cases
be compatible with veritic epistemic luck.
In order to understand where this line of thought comes from, we need to distinguish
between two kinds of cases where veritic epistemic luck is involved. The first kind of
case is of the standard Gettier-style sort, whereby something intervenes between the
subject’s justified believing and her cognitive success to ensure that the latter obtains
in a way that is completely independent of the former. Consider Roderick Chisholm’s
(1977, p. 105) Gettier-style case involving the farmer who sees a sheep-shaped object
in excellent environmental conditions, and who believes truly as a result that there is a
sheep in the field before him, but who is in fact looking at a sheep-shaped object (which
is obscuring from view the genuine sheep behind). Here we have veritic epistemic luck,
and also veritic epistemic risk, in that given how the belief was formed it is both lucky
that the belief was true (it could have easily been false) and there was a high risk that
the belief was false. Call this kind of veritic epistemic luck intervening epistemic luck
(where there is also a corresponding kind of veritic epistemic risk that is intervening
epistemic risk).
Intervening epistemic luck is to be contrasted with a second kind of veritic epistemic
luck where the luck in play does not concern anything intervening between justified
belief and cognitive success, but rather merely factors in the environment. The famous
barn façade example is a case in point.22 For recall that the agent in this case, unlike
our agent in Chisholm’s sheep case, really is seeing a genuine barn in conditions that
would normally be perfectly fine for spotting a barn. The problem, however, is that
she is in an environment where almost everything that looks like a barn is in fact a
Footnote 21 continued
Anti-risk epistemology is also able to offer a better diagnostic story regarding why the post-Gettier episte-
mological project took so many false turns. But these are issues that will need to be explored on another
occasion. For further discussion of the merits of anti-risk epistemology, see Pritchard (2016b).
22 As originally proposed in Goldman (1976), but which is credited in turn to Carl Ginet.
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barn façade, and hence although her belief is true it is nonetheless subject to veritic
epistemic luck (and, for that matter, veritic epistemic risk). Call this kind of veritic
epistemic luck/risk environmental epistemic luck (where there is also a corresponding
kind of veritic epistemic risk that is environmental epistemic risk).23
Although environmental epistemic luck and intervening epistemic luck are both
cases of veritic epistemic luck, and hence should both be incompatible with knowledge,
this has been called into question by some commentators. In particular, they have
argued that environmental epistemic luck might be compatible with knowledge. The
rationale for this is that there is a kind of positive epistemic status in play with regard
to cases of environmental epistemic luck that isn’t applicable to intervening epistemic
luck. In particular, cases involving environmental epistemic luck specifically tend to
involve not just a justified true belief, but also a cognitive achievement i.e., a cognitive
success that is properly attributable to one’s manifestation of relevant cognitive agency.
We can see this point in action by considering achievements more generally i.e.,
successes that are properly attributable to one’s manifestation of relevant agency. The
point is that intervening luck undermines genuine achievements. Suppose one skillfully
fires an arrow at a target, and hits the target, but only does so because a dog leaps up
mid-flight, seizes the bolt, and inserts it into the target. This is a case where one’s
relevant agency is manifested (one’s archery skills), and also where one is successful,
but where there is not the right kind of explanatory relationship between the former
and the latter. One is rather successful because of the intervention of the dog rather
than because of one’s manifestation of relevant agency.
In contrast, imagine a case where nothing in fact intervenes between one’s mani-
festation of one’s archery ability and one’s successfully hitting the target, but where
something could have easily intervened. Suppose, for example, that the dog very nearly
caught the bolt mid-flight, but was momentarily distracted and so happened to miss it
on this specific occasion. We now have a case involving purely environmental luck.
Just as in the previous example, it is a matter of luck that one is successful, in that
one could very easily have been unsuccessful (Relatedly, in both cases there is a high
risk of failure). But in the second case involving environmental luck, however, the
explanatory relationship between one’s success and one’s manifestation of relevant
agency does not seem to be undermined. As we might naturally put it, it is because of
one’s excellent archery abilities that one hits target, even though the pesky dog might
well have easily intervened. Accordingly, it is no less of an achievement.
This point is significant once we transplant it back to the epistemic realm. This
is because by parity of reasoning we should say that although intervening epistemic
luck precludes the possibility of a cognitive achievement, cases of environmental
epistemic luck, in contrast, are entirely compatible with there being a genuine cognitive
achievement in play (i.e., where the cognitive success is properly attributable to the
subject’s manifestation of relevant cognitive agency). But if that’s right, then there
is something epistemically better about the subject’s belief in cases of environmental
epistemic luck than in cases of intervening epistemic luck. Accordingly, given this
23 I originally introduced the distinction between intervening and environmental epistemic luck in Pritchard
(2009b), chs. 3–4). For further discussion of this distinction, see Pritchard (2009c, 2012) and Pritchard et al.
(2010), chs. 2–4.
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epistemic disanalogy between the two cases, what is to prevent one from ascribing
knowledge to the agent in the former case? In particular, the temptation is to argue
that although the intervening variety of veritic epistemic luck is incompatible with
knowledge, the kind of environmental veritic epistemic luck found in barn façade-
style case is in fact epistemically benign.24
Elsewhere I have expressed the issue raised by environmental epistemic luck in
terms of a particular kind of epistemic dependence. By epistemic dependence I mean
the ways in which whether one’s cognitive success can amount to knowledge can sig-
nificantly depend upon factors outwith one’s cognitive agency.25 I claim that epistemic
dependence of this kind comes in both a negative and a positive form. The latter is
when one exhibits a level of cognitive agency that would ordinarily not suffice for
knowledge, and yet one knows nonetheless due to a contribution from factors outwith
one’s cognitive agency.26 The kind of epistemic dependence that presently concerns
us, however, is negative epistemic dependence. This is when one exhibits a level of cog-
nitive agency that would normally suffice for knowledge as would certainly be the case
where one exhibits a cognitive achievement but where one fails to know nonetheless
due to factors outwith one’s cognitive agency that ensure that one’s cognitive success
could very easily have been a failure. Instances of environmental epistemic luck are
a case in point, in that this seems to undermine one’s knowledge even though one’s
cognitive success is properly attributable to one’s manifestation of relevant cognitive
agency (and hence qualifies as a cognitive achievement).
The challenge, however, is to explain why such cases of negative epistemic depen-
dence do not count as genuine instances of knowledge. I think that with an anti-risk
epistemology in play we are well placed to offer the required explanation. For what
is distinctive of cases of negative epistemic dependence is not just that they involve
veritic epistemic luck, but more specifically that they involve veritic epistemic risk.
That is, given how the belief was formed, then there is a high risk that one is led into
cognitive error (as would have occurred, for example, if the agent in the barn façade
case had happened to have been looking at the frontage of one of the fake barns in
the vicinity). The point is that we care about eliminating veritic epistemic luck from
knowledge because we care about eliminating veritic epistemic risk, rather than vice
versa. Once that is made explicit, then we can see that what is problematic about
cases of negative epistemic dependence is not the presence of veritic epistemic luck,
specifically, but rather that they involve high levels of epistemic risk (and hence veritic
epistemic risk).
24 See Sosa (2007), ch. 5 for a particularly high-profile endorsement of this kind of line (though note that
Sosa’s focus is not on the barn façade case here, but rather the structurally similar ‘jokester’ case). I critically
discuss Sosa’s reasons for ascribing knowledge in this case in Pritchard (2009).
25 For further discussion of this notion of epistemic dependence, see Pritchard (2016a). See also Kallestrup
and Pritchard (2013).
26 I claim that positive epistemic dependence is the best way to make sense of why one can gain testimonial
knowledge in friendly epistemic environments by, for the most part (though never exclusively), trusting an
informant. For more on this point, and on negative epistemic dependence in general, see Kallestrup and
Pritchard (2012) and Pritchard (2016a).
123
Synthese
Notice too that this point will be similarly effective against cases of negative epis-
temic dependence that are purely modal in form. In standard barn façade-style cases
the negative epistemic dependence concerns an actual feature of the environment,
such as that there are fake barns in the vicinity. But in fact one can construct cases
of negative epistemic dependence where the knowledge-undermining feature purely
concerns not the subject’s actual environment but only her purely modal environment.
We can illustrate this point by appeal to what is known as an epistemic twin earth
case27. We are to imagine two counterpart agents, one on earth and one on twin
earth. These agents are microphysical duplicates of each other, with identical causal
histories. The ‘local’ environment that they are presently causally interacting with
is also identical in every respect. Finally, the ‘normal’ environment i.e., the sorts of
things that they would normally be causally interacting with is also identical for both
subjects. Now suppose that both agents form, on the same basis, the belief that p. All
that is different with regards to the two agents is that the agent on twin earth occupies a
very different modal environment. For whereas the agent on earth is forming her belief
that p in such a way that this same basis for belief will generate true beliefs across all
close possible worlds, due to idiosyncratic features of her modal environmental the
agent on twin earth is forming her belief that p in such a way that the very same basis
for belief will generate false beliefs in close possible worlds.
What is interesting about epistemic twin earth cases is that we have effectively
kept fixed across the two subjects any possible factor that might be relevant to the
manifestation of cognitive agency. After all, one can imagine that manifestations of
agency cognitive or otherwise might be influenced by such factors as one’s actual
causal environment, one’s normal causal environment, one’s causal history, or one’s
microphysical nature. But no-one holds that manifestations of agency again, cognitive
or otherwise are influenced by factors that are exclusive to one’s modal environment.
And yet the agent on twin earth is forming her belief in such a way that it is subject
to veritic epistemic luck, in contrast to the agent on earth who is forming an identical
belief. Insofar as we grant that knowledge is incompatible with veritic epistemic luck,
then we should be inclined to treat the agent’s belief on twin earth as an instance of
negative epistemic dependence and hence deny knowledge.
Insofar as one is tempted to argue that standard barn façade-style cases might be
bona fide cases of knowledge, however, then this temptation is bound to be even
stronger in epistemic twin earth cases. For if the putative negative epistemic depen-
dence exclusively concerns a feature of the modal environment, then why think that
it should be knowledge-undermining at all? But we now have a rationale for resist-
ing this line of argument, one which directly extends from our case for thinking that
standard barn façade-style cases cannot be instances of knowledge. This is that the
agent on twin earth is forming her belief in a way that is subject to a high degree of
epistemic risk, since the target risk event of forming a false belief via this process
is in fact modally very close. As before, whereas it might seem at least debatable
whether knowledge is compatible with certain kinds of veritic epistemic luck, it is
hard to countenance the idea that knowledge might be compatible with high levels
27 See Kallestrup and Pritchard (2014).
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of epistemic risk (i.e., that knowledge is compatible with veritic epistemic risk). But
if that’s right, then we have a genuine case of negative epistemic dependence, even
though the knowledge-undermining factors at issue are purely modal.28
4 Concluding remarks
I want to conclude by emphasizing one important implication of this last point about
how anti-risk epistemology underwrites the intuition that knowledge is lacking in
epistemic twin earth cases where the epistemic luck in play is purely modal. This
is significant in that it reinforces the idea that the project of trying to exclusively
understand knowledge in terms of the manifestation of cognitive agency is doomed
to failure. Such a project which I have elsewhere termed robust virtue epistemology
has been defended in various forms by such figures as Sosa (1988, 1991, 2007,
2009), Zagzebski (1996, 1999), and Greco (e.g., 2009). The kind of negative epistemic
dependence at issue in epistemic twin earth cases is particularly problematic for robust
virtue epistemology. This is because in such cases we are keeping fixed across both
earth and twin earth anything that could be remotely relevant to the manifestation of
cognitive agency. And yet the agent on twin earth is nonetheless lacking knowledge
due to some feature of the purely modal environment. It follows that knowledge
simply cannot just be a function of the manifestation of cognitive agency as robust
virtue epistemology wants to claim. Instead, we are going to need to have a distinct
way of accommodating the fact that knowledge is incompatible with high levels of
epistemic risk. This point strongly suggests though it doesn’t yet entail that what
we should be looking for when it comes to the theory of knowledge is not a robust
virtue epistemology but rather the kind of anti-risk virtue epistemology that is able to
blend both a virtue-theoretic and an anti-risk requirement on knowledge.29 See also
(Pritchard et al. 2010, chs. 1–4) and Pritchard (2017a). The failure to explain away
cases of negative epistemic dependence thus undermines one prominent account of
knowledge and strongly suggests an alternative proposal. But this is a further issue to
be explored on another occasion.
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